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COMMENT
PICKING UP THE PIECES: THE EXCESS
INSURER'S BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST THE PRIMARY INSURER
John F. Jenks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the bad faith cause of action by an insured against
its insurer is recognized in Montana,' the Montana Supreme Court
has not directly addressed a bad faith claim brought by an excess
insurer against the primary insurer. When a judgment exceeds the
policy limit of the primary insurance policy, the excess insurer3 will
scrutinize the conduct of the primary insurer for elements of bad
faith. For example, when confronted with a claim that exceeds its
policy limits, the primary insurer may decide to litigate the claim
because the primary insurer may have little or nothing to lose. At
that point, the primary insurer is "gambling with either the excess
carrier's money or the insured's money, or both."" Although Mon-
tana's courts have not addressed the issue of bad faith in terms of
* The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professor Greg Munro of the
University of Montana School of Law and Gary M. Zadick, Esq. Errors that remain are
mine.
1. Fetter Livestock Co. v. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co., 257 F.
Supp. 4, 10 (D. Mont. 1966); Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317, 326-27 (D. Mont. 1962),
aff'd sub nom. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60,
64-65 (9th Cir. 1964); Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 274-75, 682 P.2d 725,
730 (1984).
2. But see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., - Mont .... 847
P.2d 705, 709 (1993) (holding that an underinsurance carrier did not have a bad faith claim
against a liability carrier because the insured had settled with the liability carrier).
3. The following definitions apply in this comment: (1) a primary insurer is the insur-
ance carrier with initial responsibility for liability up to the policy limits; (2) an excess in-
surer is an insurance carrier responsible for the liability exceeding the primary policy limits
up to the excess insurer's policy limits; and (3) the insured is the party who purchased the
insurance coverage from the primary and excess carriers.
4. Gary M. Bloom, Recovery Against Primary Insurer By Excess Carrier For Bad
Faith Or Negligent Failure To Settle, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 235, 237 (1969).
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an excess insurer against a primary insurer, the courts have recog-
nized an insurer's duties to settle the lawsuit and defend the in-
sured.5 This Comment examines the bad faith cause of action
brought by an excess insurer against a primary insurer and de-
scribes the various duties that the primary insurer owes to the ex-
cess insurer.
In Montana, one of the first cases to define the duties owed by
the primary insurer to the insured was Jessen v. O'Daniel.6 In Jes-
sen, Judge Jameson stated that "in determining whether a com-
promise offer of settlement should be accepted, the insurer must
give the interests of its insured equal consideration with its own
interests and must in all respects deal fairly with the insured. ' '1
Jessen set out six factors that would indicate bad faith by the in-
surer.' Along with the duty to settle, the Montana Supreme Court
has recognized a cause of action based on the insurer's failure to
defend. As the court stated in Lipinski Title Insurance Co., "the
title companies by the terms of the contract, had a clear duty to
defend Lipinski, and in breaching that clear duty the title compa-
nies acted in bad faith."10 The Montana Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act defines the procedural rules an insured must follow
in pursuing a bad faith claim against the insurer.1"
Although the primary insurer's duties to its insured are well
defined, the Montana Supreme Court has yet to address the issue
of bad faith between a primary and an excess insurer. When
faced with this issue the court will need to define the limits of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as determine which par-
5. Jessen, 210 F. Supp. at 319. See also Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 202 Mont. 1, 16-17,
655 P.2d 970, 978 (1982).
6. 210 F. Supp. 319.
7. Id. at 325-26.
8. Id. at 326-27 (stating the factors as follows: (1) likelihood of a verdict in excess of
policy limits, (2) whether a defendant's verdict on liability is doubtful, (3) whether the in-
surer has given due regard to the recommendations of its trial counsel, (4) whether the
insured has been informed of all settlement demands and offers, (5) whether the insured has
demanded that the insurer settle within policy limits, and (6) whether an offer of contribu-
tion has been made by the insured). The court stated that "no one factor is decisive." Id.
9. Lipinski, 202 Mont. at 16-17, 655 P.2d at 978.
10. Id.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-101 to -242 (1991).
12. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue in a variety of circumstances. See
Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Accident Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990)
(personal injury); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 393 N.W.2d 479
(Mich. 1986) (medical malpractice); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins.
Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1983) (worker's compensation); Maine Bonding & Casualty
Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296 (Or. 1985) (property damage liability policy);
American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 810 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (legal
malpractice).
[Vol. 54
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PRIMARY INSURER BAD FAITH
ties can recover on a bad faith claim.13 Because Montana recog-
nizes bad faith, the issue becomes "not what the basis of recovery
will be against the insurer, but rather who may recover."'"
This Comment describes potential situations in which primary
and excess coverage15 disputes may arise and then surveys the vari-
ous legal theories that other jurisdictions use to support the bad
faith cause of action by excess insurers.' 6 After examining the du-
ties owed by the primary insurer to the excess insurer, this Com-
ment suggests a three-step analysis to define the duties owed by
the primary insurer to the excess insurer. This Comment concludes
that the appropriate legal theory for recovery is based on a direct
duty owed by the primary insurer to the excess insurer.
II. PRIMARY AND EXCESS COVERAGE ISSUES
The issue of primary and excess claim coverage arises in two
general situations. The first situation is termed the " 'true' pri-
mary-excess insurance relationship."' 7 In this situation the insured
carries two insurance policies: one providing primary coverage and
the other excess coverage. The carrier issuing the excess policy is
not liable for the amount covered by the primary policy, but is
liable for amounts exceeding the primary policy limits.'
The second situation occurs when two separate policies cover
two different insureds and one or both policies contain an "other
insurance" clause. 9 A common example is a vehicle accident in
which one policy insures the driver and another policy insures the
vehicle.2" Another example is a vehicle accident involving both
13. 15A MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 58:4 (rev. 2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1992).
14. See Bloom, supra note 4, at 235 (emphasis in original).
15. Excess coverage is defined as a policy under which the insurer "is liable only for
the amount of loss or damage in excess of the coverage provided by the other policy or
policies of insurance." 16 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 62:48 (rev. 2d ed. 1983 &
Supp. 1992).
16. The leading law review articles on the subject of bad faith between a primary in-
surer and an excess insurer are: Michael D. Gallagher & Edward C. German, Resolution of
Settlement Conflicts Among Insureds, Primary Insurers, and Excess Insurers: Analysis of
the Current State of the Law and Suggested Guidelines for the Future, 61 NEB. L. REV. 284
(1982); Patrick R. Griffin, Excess Liability Insurance, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 375 (1979); and
Anthony M. Lanzone & Stephen G. Ringel, Duties of a Primary Insurer to an Excess In-
surer, 61 NEB. L. REV. 259 (1982).
17. See Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 16, at 269.
18. 44 Am. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1789 (1982).
19. See Western Pac. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 416 P.2d 468 (Wash. 1966) (in-
volving two insureds and two separate insurance policies). This situation is sometimes called
a "coincidence case." Russo v. Rochford, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 957 (App. Div. 1984).
20. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 335 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1972).
1993]
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bodily injury liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage."
The Montana Supreme Court has dealt with separate policies
covering both employer and employee.2 2 In Guaranty National In-
surance Co. v. State Farm Insurance Co., the employee was in-
volved in an accident while driving his own car, but was considered
within the scope of his employment.23 Once a court finds that a
primary-excess insurance relationship exists, regardless of whether
the relationship involves one insured with two policies or two in-
sureds with separate policies, the court must determine which legal
theory supports a bad faith cause of action.
III. LEGAL THEORIES RECOGNIZING THE BAD FAITH CAUSE OF
ACTION
Courts recognizing bad faith actions instituted against primary
insurers by excess insurers use one of four legal theories to support
a recovery by the excess insurer despite the lack of privity between
the excess and primary insurers: (1) equitable subrogation; (2) di-
rect duty between the primary and excess carrier; (3) contractual
subrogation; or (4) triangular reciprocal duty between the insured,
the primary carrier, and the excess carrier.
4
A. Equitable Subrogation
Most courts rely on the theory of equitable subrogation to
overcome the lack of a contractual relationship (or privity) be-
tween the primary insurer and the excess insurer.25 This theory
was first implicitly recognized in American Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. All American Bus Lines Inc.26 The Tenth Circuit stated
that:
[T]he equities between the two companies were not equal; that
[the primary insurer] was allegedly guilty of bad faith while [the
excess insurer] was at most guilty of breach of contract; and that,
as between the two, it would be just and equitable for American
21. Sullivan v. Doe, 159 Mont. 50, 495 P.2d 193 (1972). See also St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., - Mont. -, -, 847 P.2d 705, 709 (1993) (not ruling
on whether underinsured motorist coverage was in excess of primary liability coverage in a
motor vehicle accident).
22. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 238 Mont. 324, 777 P.2d 353
(1989).
23. Id. at 327, 777 P.2d at 355.
24. See Gallagher & German, supra note 16, at 334.
25. Griffin, supra note 16, at 379. See generally C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Right to
Subrogation, as Against Primary Insurer, of Liability Insurer Providing Secondary Insur-
ance, 31 A.L.R.2d 1324 (1953 & Supp. 1992).
26. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951).
[Vol. 54
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to bear the loss occasioned by its own misconduct." 7
A California Federal District Court articulated a better expla-
nation of equitable subrogation in Peter v. Travelers Insurance
Co. 28 In Peter, the primary insurer refused to consider any offer
over $15,000 in settlement of a personal injury claim.29 The pri-
mary insurer's policy limit was $250,000.30 The jury awarded the
injured party $407,000.31 Following trial the parties compromised
the claim with the excess insurer paying $137,984.10 over the pri-
mary insurer's limits.2 The excess insurer then brought a bad faith
claim against the primary insurer.3 3 In holding for the excess in-
surer, the court relied on the doctrine of equitable subrogation to
support a bad faith cause of action against the primary insurer.34
The court quoted an earlier California case for the elements of eq-
uitable subrogation:
(1) The insured has suffered a loss for which the party to be
charged is liable, either because the latter is a wrongdoer whose
act or omission caused the loss or because he is legally responsible
to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer; (2) the in-
surer, in whole or in part, has compensated the insured for the
same loss for which the party to be charged is liable; (3) the in-
sured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the party
to be charged, which action the insured could have asserted for
his own benefit had he not been compensated for his loss by the
insurer; (4) the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or
omission upon which the liability of the party to be charged de-
pends; (5) justice requires that the loss should be entirely shifted
from the insurer to the party to be charged, whose equitable posi-
tion is inferior to that of the insurer; and (6) the insurer's dam-
ages are in a stated sum, usually the amount it has paid to its
insured, assuming the payment was not voluntary and was
reasonable. 5
Additionally, the court in Peter found that the primary insurer's
reluctance to negotiate for a settlement over the $15,000 figure was
the proximate cause of the excess insurer's $137,984.10 loss. 36
27. Id. at 238.
28. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
29. Id. at 1348.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1349-50.
35. Id. at 1350 (quoting Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 64
Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (Ct. App. 1967)).
36. Id.
1993] 389
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Although not in the primary-excess insurer context, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has recognized equitable subrogation between
an insurer and its insured.3 7 The court in Skauge v. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. held that an insurer, who had
paid for the insured's loss, was subrogated to the extent of its pay-
ment to its insured as long as the insured had been "maide whole
for his entire loss."'" In Skauge, the insured was proceeding with a
claim against the alleged tortfeasor s9 The court classified subroga-
tion as either legal or conventional.'0 Legal subrogation arises be-
cause of payment made by the insurer, whereas conventional sub-
rogation arises from the contract between the parties." This
distinction has no legal significance in most cases because the same
facts supporting legal subrogation also support conventional subro-
gation.' 2 The court expressed the following policy in support of eq-
uitable subrogation: •
The theory behind this principle is that absent repayment'of the
insurer the insured would be unjustly enriched by virtue of recov-
ery from both the insurer and the wrongdoer, or in absence of
such double recovery by the insured, the third party would go
free despite his legal obligation in connection with the loss.'
Finally, the court held that "an express assignment of the
claim to [the insurer] was unnecessary, since legal subrogation
arose from the fact of payment, and this was not waived or made
conditional by agreement of the parties."" Therefore, the basis for
recovery under equitable subrogation is already established in
Montana law.'"
Other courts have applied the equitable subrogation theory to
primary and excess carrier cases. For example, the Arizona Su-
preme Court recently adopted the theory of equitable subrogation
between primary and excess carriers."6 There, the court discussed
two important policy reasons to support its holding. First, equita-
37. Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 Mont. 521, 565 P.2d 628 (1977).
38. Id. at 528, 565 P.2d at 632.
39. Id. at 523, 565 P.2d at 629.
40. Id. at 525, 565 P.2d at 630.
41. Id.
42. 16 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61:2 (rev. 2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1992).
43. Skauge, 172 Mont. at 524-25, 565 P.2d at 630 (citing 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 61:18).
44. Id. at 526, 565 P.2d at 631.
45. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-414 (1991) (explaining limitations on Workers'
Compensation subrogation); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler, 192 Mont. 351, 355, 628 P.2d 667,
670 (1981) (prohibiting subrogation of medical payments made under an automobile policy).
46. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749, 754
(Ariz. 1990).
[Vol. 54
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ble subrogation encourages fair and reasonable settlement of law-
suits because primary insurers are more likely to settle if they face
a bad faith charge by an excess insurer."' Second, equitable subro-
gation prevents unfair distribution of losses between primary and
exfcess insurers when the excess insurer settles the claim and the
primary insurer refuses to contribute to the settlement.4 s
Although the Montana Supreme Court has not dealt with a
bad faith claim between a primary and an excess carrier, the court
has implied that it would adopt equitable subrogation."9 In St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
insured carried underinsured motorist coverage with St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company. 0 The insured was injured in an
automobile accident caused by an insured of Allstate Insurance
Company.5 1 After a jury trial, Allstate paid its policy limit and St.
Paul paid the balance of the judgment under the underinsured mo-
torist coverage.52 St. Paul then sued Allstate for refusing to settle
the case for Allstate's policy limits.5 3 The Montana Supreme Court
held that even if it recognized equitable subrogation, St. Paul
could not recover because the insured had previously sued Allstate
for its bad faith refusal to settle the case .5 Because the insured's
bad faith claim against Allstate had been dismissed, St. Paul was
not equitably subrogated to the same bad faith claim.55
The extent of the excess insurer's rights as a subrogee has
been defined by the Seventh Circuit.5 s The Seventh Circuit held
that the excess insurer "stands in the shoes of the insured,' 57 but
"acquires no greater or lesser rights than those possessed by the
subrogor. ' 5 s This gives rise to the situation in which an insured's
misconduct, such as failing to cooperate, may defeat the excess in-
surer's right to recovery.59 One method of overcoming this weak-
47. Id. at 753.
48. Id.
49. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., Mont .... 847
P.2d 705, 709 (1993).
50. Id. at -, 847 P.2d at 706.
51. Id. at -, 847 P.2d at 706.
52. Id. at __, 847 P.2d at 706.
53. Id. at -, 847 P.2d at 706.
54. Id. at -, 847 P.2d at 709.
55. Id. at -, 847 P.2d at 709.
56. See Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 909 F.2d
228, 232 (7th Cir. 1990).
57. Id. (quoting Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d
1038, 1041 (Cal. 1980)).
58. Id.
59. See Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76, 80-81 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that the insured's consent to try the case barred the excess carrier from
1993]
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ness in the subrogation theory is to impose a direct duty between
the primary insurer and the excess insurer so that the insured's
misconduct does not bar the excess insurer from recovery. 0
B. Direct Duty Between the Primary and the Excess Carrier
The second method of overcoming the lack of privity between
primary and excess carriers imposes a tort related duty on the pri-
mary insurer. In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Home Indemnity Co.,6"
an Illinois Federal District Court recognized that, although equita-
ble subrogation would normally apply, the excess insurer had
failed to put the primary insurer on notice that the excess insurer's
bad faith claims were based on subrogated rights.2 Thus, the court
looked to tort law to impose a duty of care when "the alleged
tortfeasor could have reasonably foreseen that its conduct would
injure the plaintiff and policy considerations justify placing the
risks and the burden of care on the defendant. '6 3
Other state courts have analyzed the direct duty theory. A
New York court stated that it "does not alter the defense obliga-
tion which each carrier ... owe[s] to the common insured with
whom each has a contract, or the responsibility that ... an excess
carrier has to assist the primary in the.defense of a claim against
the insured."64 Likewise, a New Jersey court found a direct duty to
settle by holding that "the primary carrier owes to the excess car-
rier the same positive duty to take the initiative and attempt to
negotiate a settlement within its policy limit that it owes its [in-
sured]." 6 Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Maine Bonding
& Casualty Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co.,"6 discussed the vari-
ous duties that a primary carrier owes an excess carrier:
A primary insurer owes an excess insurer essentially the same
duty of due diligence in claims handling and settlement negotiat-
ing it owes to an insured-due care under all the circumstances.
In considering the manner in which it will defend a claim, the
primary insurer may consider its own interests, but it must also
consider the interests of other parties whose interests are in-
asserting a bad faith claim against the primary carrier under equitable subrogation).
60. Certain Underwriters, 909 F.2d at 233.
61. 714 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
62. Id. at 960. See also Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co.,
462 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 463 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1984).
63. Ranger Ins. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 961.
64. Russo v. Rochford, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 959 (App. Div. 1984) (emphasis in original).
65. Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 372 A.2d 1124, 1127 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1977).
66. 693 P.2d 1296 (Or. 1985).
[Vol. 54
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volved, notably, the insured and the excess carrier.
Although at first blush the direct duty theory appears to differ
significantly from equitable subrogation, in reality a bad faith
claim arises from the tort principle of a duty owed by the insurer
to its insured. "As long as the scope of the duty is appropriately
defined, the primary carrier is not held to a standard of care that it
did not already owe to the insured."68 Thus, the Montana Supreme
Court could logically apply the same duty standard owed by pri-
mary insurers to insureds and extend it to excess insurers.
C. Contractual Subrogation
Recovery under contractual subrogation is based on the stan-
dard subrogation clause found in most insurance contracts to sup-
port a bad faith cause of action between a primary carrier and an
excess carrier. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Reserve Insurance.
Co.,6 9 the New Hampshire Supreme Court first faced the issue of
whether an excess carrier had a bad faith cause of action against
the primary carrier. The insured had primary coverage with Re-
serve and excess coverage with Allstate.70 Following a jury award
that exceeded the primary policy limits, Allstate sued Reserve, al-
leging that Reserve negligently failed to settle the claim within its
policy limits.71 Allstate sued, in the alternative, on the standard
subrogation clause and under general principles of negligence,
claiming Reserve owed a direct duty of due care to Allstate.72
In rejecting the negligence claim, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court stated, "[w]e perceive no relationship between the
two insurers which would impose directly upon Reserve a duty to
exercise due care in regard to Allstate. ' 73 The court did allow All-
state's cause of action based on the standard subrogation clause
because it was an assignable cause of action recognized under New
Hampshire law.74 Finally, the court held that the assignment from
the insured to Allstate was effective even though the insured had
not suffered any loss.7 Thus, contractual subrogation simply relies
on the language of the insurance contract.
67. Id. at 1302.
68. Ranger Ins. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 961.
69. 373 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1976).
70. Id. at 340.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
1993]
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D. Triangular Reciprocity
The triangular reciprocity theory holds that all three parties
(the insured, the primary insurer, and the excess insurer) owe re-
ciprocal duties to each other. In Transit Casualty Corp. v. Spink
Corp.7 ' the California Court of Appeals found a three-way duty be-
tween the insured, the primary carrier, and the excess carrier. 7
The insured, an engineering firm, refused to contribute its deducti-
ble toward settlement of a wrongful death claim because settle-
ment would injure its professional reputation.78 The primary policy
required the insured's written consent to settle claims.79 After los-
ing at trial, Transit, the excess carrier, brought suit against its in-
sured and the primary carrier for refusing to settle.80
In affirming judgment for the excess carrier, the court found
that "[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
not burden the carrier alone; it is reciprocal, binding the policy
holder as well as the carrier." 81 In analyzing equitable subrogation,
the court addressed the problem caused by the insured's refusal to
settle because the subrogee's (excess carrier's) rights cannot rise
any higher then the subrogor's .(insured's) rights.82 Thus, under
principles' of equitable subrogation, the excess insurer's claim
would fail. The court reasoned that resorting "to equitable subro-
gation as the foundation of the excess insurer's claim tends toward
undesirable, all-or-nothing results."'8 3
The court in Transit relied on principles of negligence to sup-
port the duty that flowed between the three parties.8 4 These prin-
ciples include reasonably foreseeable harm creating a duty of care,
comparative negligence, and apportionment of liability between
the defendants.8 5 These three principles represent reciprocal duties
of care which should guide the parties' conduct during settlement
negotiations.8
The triangular reciprocity theory was short-lived. Less than
one year after the Court of Appeals decided Transit, the California
Supreme Court overruled Transit in Commercial Union Assurance
76. 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1979).
77. Id. at 366.
78. Id. at 364.
79. Id. at 363.
80. Id. at 364.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 365.
83. Id. at 366.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
10
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Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.8 7 Although the court conceded that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was reciprocal, the court
eliminated the duty to settle on the part of the insured. 8 In Com-
mercial Union, the excess carrier sued both the primary carrier
and the insured for failure to settle."9 The insured provided self-
insurance coverage between the primary policy and the excess pol-
icy.9 0 The court explained that the extent of the good faith duty
was defined both by the nature of the bargain between the insurer
and the insured and by the legitimate expectations arising from
the contract.9 In defining the duty, of good faith the court stated:
The insured owes no duty to defend or indemnify the excess car-
rier; hence, the carrier can possess no reasonable expectation that
the insured will accept a settlement offer as a means of "protect-
ing" the carrier from exposure. The protection of the insurer's pe-
cuniary interests is simply not the object of the bargain.92
The court concluded that if an excess carrier wished to preserve
the right to recover from the insured for refusing to settle, the ex-
cess carrier must put appropriate language in the insurance con-
tract.9 3 Under Commercial Union the excess insurer's only source
of recovery is the primary insurer.
Given the proper case, the Montana Supreme Court should
decide the appropriate legal theory to employ. The court's next
step will then be to determine the duties the primary insurer owes
to the excess insurer.
IV. PRIMARY INSURER'S DUTIES
Outside Montana, primary insurers generally owe five duties
to excess insurers: The duty to (1) defend, (2) appeal, (3) commu-
nicate, (4) cooperate, and (5) settle.9' These are the same duties
that the primary insurer owes its insured.9 5
A. Duty to Defend
The language in insurance contracts usually states, and most
courts generally hold, that the primary insurer has the duty to de-
87. 610 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Cal. 1980).
88. Id. at 1042.
89. Id. at 1040.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1041.
92. Id. at 1041-42.
93. Id. at 1043.
94. See Griffin, supra note 16, at 383-88.
95. See id. at 382.
1993]
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fend."' Most insurance contracts provide that the duty to defend
ceases upon payment of policy limits, either by judgment or settle-
ment. 7 The Montana Supreme Court recognized this duty between
insureds and their primary carriers in Montana in Lipinski v. Title
Insurance Co.98
The Montana Supreme Court has defined the scope of the pri-
mary insurer's duty to defend in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Co. v. Thompson.99 In Thompson the insured sued his carrier
after the carrier refused to defend the insured in a subrogation ac-
tion brought by a joint tortfeasor.' 00 Because the carrier had paid
the policy limits, the carrier argued that it no longer had a duty to
defend its insured.' 0' The court rejected this argument and held
that a duty to defend attached even after the carrier had paid the
policy limits.10 ' It further stated that the duty to defend is "inde-
pendent of, and broader than the insurer's promise to pay. "103
Therefore, under Thompson the initial duty to defend is logically
placed on the primary carrier because the primary carrier usually
conducts the investigation and settlement negotiations. 10 4
Some courts have found, however, that the excess carrier also
has a duty to defend. In Lujan v. Gonzales,105 the driver of a
pickup struck and killed a pedestrian.' 6 Allstate insured the driver
and Farmers Insurance Group insured the pickup.'0 7 Although All-
state was an excess insurer, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that Allstate still had a duty to participate in the defense even
though Farmers was actively defending Gonzales.' 08 The court rea-
soned that under the policy language Allstate had a duty to defend
false claims in which there was no obligation to pay.' 09 Therefore,
96. Macloskie v. Royal Indem. Co., 254 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D. S.C. 1966) (holding that
the primary insurer was fully responsible for defending the insured and the excess carrier
had no such responsibility). See generally Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Liability Insurance:
Excess Carrier's Right of Action Against Primary Carrier for Improper or Inadequate De-
fense of Claim, 49 A.L.R.4TH 304 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
97. 7C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682 (Walter F. Berdal
ed., 1979).
98. 202 Mont. 1, 655 P.2d 970 (1982).
99. 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967).
100. Id. at 184, 433 P.2d at 797.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 188, 433 P.2d at 799.
103. Id.
104. See Russo v. Rochford, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 960 (App. Div. 1984).
105. 501 P.2d 673 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
106. Id. at 675.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 677.
109. Id.
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the duty to defend arose because a potential for payment
existed."10
The Montana Supreme Court, in Guaranty National Insur-
ance Co. v. State Farm Insurance Co.,' ordered the primary car-
rier to indemnify the excess carrier when the excess carrier settled
the lawsuit." 2 The court first decided that an employee's vehicle
insurance carrier provided primary coverage and the employer's in-
surance carrier provided excess coverage." s The underlying claim
arose from a car accident in which the employee, while driving his
personal vehicle in the scope of his employment, killed one person
and injured another."" During trial, the excess carrier successfully
moved to join the primary carrier in its defense of the employer
after the district court dismissed the employee."15 The excess car-
rier then settled the suit on the eve of the last day of trial."16 In
support of its holding the court stated that the excess carrier "was
bound by a fiduciary duty to settle the case and will not now be
penalized for fulfilling its contractual and fiduciary obligations."' 1 7
The scope of the excess carrier's duty to defend is not clear
from the preceding cases. In Guaranty National Insurance, the
Montana court based its decision on the contract language of the
two policies. The court in Lujan, on the other hand, cited an Ar-
kansas case which implied that an excess carrier need defend only
if the excess carrier's insured would potentially be exposed to ex-
cess liability."18 The best approach to defining the duty to defend
is to extend the duty to the excess carrier when the claim exceeds
the primary policy limits. Under this approach, the excess carrier
can adequately protect both its interests and the insured's
interests.
The primary carrier that wrongfully refuses to defend may be
held liable for the defense costs. In Western Pacific Insurance Co.
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,"'  the Washington Supreme
110. Id.
111. 238 Mont. 324, 777 P.2d 353 (1989).
112. Id. at 330, 777 P.2d at 357.
113. Id. at 329, 777 P.2d at 356.
114. Id. at 326, 777 P.2d at 354.
115. Id. (The district court dismissed the employee because he was acting within the
scope of his employment.).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 330, 777 P.2d at 357.
118. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 216,
220 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
119. 416 P.2d 468 (Wash. 1966). See generally Annotation, Allocation of Defense
Costs Between Primary and Excess Insurance Carriers, 19 A.L.R.4TH 107 (1983 & Supp.
1992).
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.Court held the primary carrier liable to the excess carrier for the
costs of defending the lawsuit. 120 Like Guaranty National Insur-
ance, the primary carrier in Western Pacific Insurance Co. insured
the vehicle while the excess carrier insured the driver.12 The
Washington Supreme Court held that the primary insurer could
not refuse to defend based on its own unilateral decision that its
policy did not cover the accident which was the basis of the
lawsuit. 2 '
The issue of apportioning defense costs between a primary
carrier and an excess carrier has arisen in the Montana Federal
District Court. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 2 5 the Montana Federal District Court
prorated defense costs between two primary insurers. 24 The court
also held the two insurers pro rata liable for the settlement.'25
In American States Insurance Co. v. Angstman Motors,
Inc.126 the Montana Federal District Court relied on Liberty Mu-
tual and prorated defense costs between a primary and an excess
carrier.' In American States, Angstman Motors arranged for a
prospective buyer to test drive a grain truck.2 8 Before purchasing
the truck, however, the prospective buyer's employee was involved
in an accident while driving the truck.2 9 The court found that
Angstman Motors' insurance policy provided primary coverage and
the prospective buyer's insurance policy provided excess cover-
age.' 30 The Angstman decision is arguably incorrect because, al-
though both policies provided primary coverage, the court inter-
preted one policy as excess coverage due to an "Other Insurance"
clause.' Thus, the Liberty Mutual rule was inapplicable.' 32
The equitable approach to this issue is to pro rate the costs of
defending based on the contributions that each carrier tenders to-
120. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 416 P.2d at 472.
121. Id. at 469.
122. Id. at 472.
123. 232 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mont. 1964).
124. Id. at 84-85.
125. Id.
126. 343 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mont. 1972).
127. Id. at 587.
128. Id. at 579.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 586.
131. Id.
132. The issue of prorating defense costs between a primary and an excess insurer in
Montana is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Mont. 1991). In Guaranty National, Judge
Hatfield ordered a pro rata division between the primary and excess insurer of costs in-
curred while defending their common insured. Id. at 1398.
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ward the settlement or final judgment. This gives each carrier an
incentive to cooperate and to bargain for the lowest settlement or
prepare the best defense at trial.
B. Duty to Appeal
Although most insurance policies do not contain provisions re-
quiring an insurer to appeal, the general rule is that a duty to ap-
peal exists when there are reasonable grounds for an appeal.133 In
Fidelity General Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co."" the pri-
mary insurer refused to appeal the trial verdict. The excess insurer
stepped in and pursued the appeal.'3 5 In granting relief to the ex-
cess carrier, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
held that an excess carrier is entitled to reimbursement for dis-
charging the primary insurer's duty to appeal.'3 6 The court found a
legitimate basis for an appeal and thus, under the insurance pol-
icy's covenant to defend, the primary carrier was obligated to pur-
sue an appeal.' 7 Placing the duty to appeal on the primary insurer
is logical because the primary insurer generally conducts the litiga-
tion precipitating the appeal.
C. Duty to Communicate
The law imposes a duty upon a primary insurer to keep its
insured informed.'3 1 In Wooster v. Midcentury Insurance Co.'"e
the insurer failed to inform its insured that it had settled for policy
limits but had not obtained a release of the insured.' 0 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the insurer
and held:
[A]n insurer, when it is faced with a claim for amounts over the
policy limit, and when it is unable to obtain a general release of
its insured even if it pays the policy limits, must let its insured
know that it intends to pay the policy limits, or the final portion
thereof, and must cooperate with the insured and give the insured
133. See Griffin, supra note 16, at 385.
134. 278 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 1967).
135. Id. at 788.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So.2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980) (listing
several duties owed by the insurer, such as advising the insured of settlement opportunities,
advising the insured as to the probable outcome of the litigation, warning the insured of
excess judgment, and advising the insured of any steps that it might take to avoid an excess
judgment).
139. 271 Cal. Rptr. 664 (Ct. App. 1990).
140. Id. at 665.
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a reasonable opportunity to participate in an attempt to make a
joint settlement of the claim.""
Although Wooster did not involve an excess insurer, the same
duty should apply between a primary insurer and an excess in-
surer.14 2 The excess insurer merely replaces the insured for claims
exceeding the primary policy up to the outer limits of the excess
policy.143 Common sense mandates that the primary insurer inform
the excess insurer whenever the claim exceeds the primary policy
limits.
D. Duty to Cooperate
Closely related to the duty to communicate is the duty to co-
operate. In United States Fire Insurance v. Morrison Assur-
ance,' the Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict for
the excess insurer on its bad faith claim against the primary in-
surer." 5 The court reasoned that:
[d]espite a request from [the excess insurer], [the primary in-
surer] failed to communicate the status of this case for eighteen
months. [The excess insurer] was not advised as to the settlement
negotiations, the probable outcome of the litigation, or the possi-
bility of an excess judgment; nor was it given any input into steps
that could be taken to avoid an excess judgment. ' 6
The court held that although the insured had been informed and
in fact consented to the trial, those actions did not operate as a
defense to the excess insurer's bad faith claim. 1 7 Recognizing a
duty to cooperate is merely another method of reducing the costs
of litigation and encouraging the prompt settlement of claims.
E. Duty to Settle
The insurer's duty to its insured to settle has been part of
Montana law since Jessen v. O'Daniel.48 The Montana Federal
141. Id. at 673-74.
142. See Griffin, supra note 16, at 387. For a contrary holding, see Smoral v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (App. Div. 1971) (holding that a primary carrier had no duty to
keep an excess carrier informed).
143. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864
(Minn. 1976) ("If the insured purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess
insurer for himself.").
144. 600 So.2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
145. Id. at 1153.
146. Id. at 1151.
147. Id. at 1152-53.
148. See Gibson v. Western Fire. Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 274, 682 P.2d 725, 730
(1984).
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District Court in Jessen stated that "in determining whether a
compromise offer of settlement should be accepted, the insurer
must give the interests of its insured equal consideration with its
own interests and must in all respects 'deal fairly with the
insured." 4"
Other jurisdictions have extended this duty to excess insur-
ers.150 In Peter, the California Federal District Court stated that
"[u]nder the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the duty owed an
excess insurer is identical to that owed the insured."151 Courts
finding existing duties between the primary and the excess carriers
have included among those duties the duty to settle. 6
V. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF THE BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION
The Montana Supreme Court should employ a three-step
analysis when examining an excess insurer's bad faith cause of ac-
tion against a primary insurer. The first step of this analysis is to
establish that a primary-excess carrier relationship exists. Next,
the court must choose a legal theory to support the bad faith cause
of action. Finally, the court must determine which duty or duties
the primary carrier failed to perform. This three-step analysis pro-
vides a logical means of analyzing the various issues comprising a
bad faith cause of action. These issues include the two contexts in
which a bad faith cause of action occurs, the four legal theories
used to support this cause of action, and the five duties owed by
the primary insurer to the excess insurer.
The first step in this analysis is to determine if a primary-
excess relationship exists between the two carriers. This can be re-
solved by determining whether there is one insured covered by two
policies or two insureds covered by two separate policies. '53 Once
149. Id. at 325-26.
150. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315, 320 (10th
Cir. 1985) (applying Kansas law); Vencill v. Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371,
1376 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 202, 204
(Md. 1987); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 393 N.W.2d 479, 483
(Mich. 1986); Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn.
1976); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980).
151. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
152. Vencill, 433 F. Supp. at 1377 ("It is the affirmative duty of an insurer to pursue
serious negotiations, particularly in the case with which [the primary insurer] was con-
fronted.") (citations omitted). See also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 714 F. Supp.
956, 960 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Annotation, Excess Carrier's Right to Maintain Action Against
Primary Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 10
A.L.R.4TH 879 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
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the primary-excess carrier relationship is established, the next step
is to choose the appropriate legal theory.
Although most courts have adopted the equitable subrogation
legal theory,1 54 the better approach is to recognize a direct duty
between the primary carrier and the excess carrier.' 5 The direct
duty legal theory allows an excess carrier to recover even though
the insured engaged in culpable conduct that would destroy the
excess carrier's bad faith claim under equitable subrogation.156
By imposing a direct duty on the primary insurer to exercise
that degree of care "as would have been used by an ordinarily pru-
dent insurer with no policy limit applicable to the claim,"' 57 the
court can apportion liability between the primary insurer and the
excess insurer based on principles of comparative negligence. Com-
parative negligence is appropriate because the primary and excess
carrier share common obligations to the insured such as claims ad-
justment, settlement, and defense responsibilities.'5 8
Under limited circumstances, the insured should also be held
liable for breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Kai-
ser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp.15' the
California Court of Appeals held that both the insured and the pri-
mary carrier owed the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the
excess carrier.'8 0 In Kaiser Foundation Hospitals the insured and
the primary carrier allegedly fraudulently assigned the dates of
malpractice claims so that the excess carrier became liable.'61 In
reversing summary judgment for the insured the court held that
"the duty of good faith and fair dealing was owed to the excess
insurer both by Kaiser, the excess insured, as well as by Lloyd's
the primary insurer." ''"2 Subjecting both the insured and the pri-
154. See Griffin, supra note 16, at 379. See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., - Mont. -, -, 847 P.2d 705, 709 (1993) (court implied that it would
adopt equitable subrogation between primary and excess insurers).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
156. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Accident Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 228, 233
(7th Cir. 1990).
157. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Or.
1985).
158. See Russo v. Rochford, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 962 (App. Div. 1984).
159. 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1979).
160. Id. at 682.
161. Id. at 680.
162. Id. at 682. It is important to note that the insured's duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the excess insurer was expressly limited by the California Supreme Court when it
held that "the insured status as such is not a license for the insured to engage in uncon-
scionable acts which would subvert the legitimate rights and expectations of the excess in-
surance carrier." Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038,
1043 (Cal. 1980).
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mary insurer to the duty of good faith and fair dealing minimizes
costs to everyone by encouraging cooperation."6 3
The policy reasons behind imposing a direct duty were best
articulated by the Illinois Federal District Court in Ranger Insur-
ance Co.:
[These reasons] include the encouragement of settlements when
an offer exists at or near the policy limits, discouraging gambling
with the excess carrier's money, hoping to keep excess liability
insurance premiums low, reducing the necessity for the excess
carrier to participate in the defense of the action to protect its
rights, and reflecting the duties of the primary carrier to perform
the duty which it has delegated to itself, that is, providing pri-
mary coverage.' 64
These policy justifications reflect the expectations of the parties.
Additionally, the primary carrier can foresee that its bad faith con-
duct will injure the excess carrier.
The third step in the bad faith analysis is to determine which
duty or duties the primary carrier failed to perform.' The pri-
mary carrier can easily determine the duties owed to the excess
carrier; these duties are essentially the same duties that the pri-
mary carrier owes the insured. 6 Therefore, the type of conduct
that subjects the primary insurer to a bad faith claim by the in-
sured should subject the primary insurer to a bad faith claim by
the excess insurer. The court can use the tort concept of foresee-
able harm to determine whether the bad faith conduct of the pri-
mary insurer injured the excess insurer. Thus, the well-established
bad faith guidelines in Montana case law would guide a primary
insurer's relationship with an excess insurer.'67
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court will inevitably face the issue of
163. See Maine Bonding, 693 P.2d at 1302 ("Relieving the primary insurer of its duty
to diligently defend in those cases in which excess coverage and excess exposure exist may
give the primary insurer a disincentive to settle."). See also Story v. City of Bozeman, 242
Mont. 436, 450, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (1990) (holding "that every contract, regardless of type,
contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing").
164. Ranger Ins. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 961 (quoting R. LONG, THE LAW OF LiABILITY
INSURANCE § 5.63 at 5-472 (1980) (alteration in original).
165. See supra text accompanying note 94.
166. 14 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:27 (rev. 2d ed. 1983 & Supp.
1992). See also supra text accompanying note 95.
167. See Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984). See also
Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962).
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bad faith between a primary carrier and an excess carrier. 6 8 After
deciding whether a primary-excess relationship exists between the
insurance carriers, the court must choose a legal theory to deter-
mine the validity of the bad faith claim. The appropriate legal the-
ory in support of this cause of action should be a direct duty flow-
ing between the primary and the excess carrier. This would allow
the court to use currently defined standards to measure the par-
ties' conduct and apportion liability. The standards used to mea-
sure the primary carrier's conduct towards the excess carrier
should be the same standards used to measure the primary car-
rier's conduct towards the insured. In limited situations, miscon-
duct by the insured, amounting to a breach of good faith and fair
dealing against the excess carrier should support a recovery by the
excess carrier from the insured.6 9 Imposing duties on the insured
and the primary carrier protects the excess carrier against events
over which the excess carrier may have little or no control over.
168. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., - Mont. - - 847
P.2d 705, 709 (1993) (although not in the primary-excess context, the court denied the un-
derinsurer's bad faith claim under equitable subrogation because the underinsurer's insured
had already asserted the bad faith claim).
169. See Kaiser Found. Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 153 Cal. Rptr. 678,
682 (Ct. App. 1979).
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